No, not successfully—at least not yet, according to recent analysis as of early September 2026. The African Union (AU) has permanent membership in the G20 (secured in 2023 under India’s presidency) and is now Africa’s primary institutional voice there after South Africa’s effective sidelining under the US 2026 presidency, but it has not robustly carried forward the developmental, Africa-focused agenda that South Africa advanced. Africa’s priorities have lost ground, with limited visible pushback from the AU.
Context: From South Africa’s Leadership to the Current Vacuum
South Africa has been a G20 member since the forum’s founding in 1999 (initially at ministerial level) and was long the sole African permanent member. The AU gained permanent membership in 2023 at the New Delhi summit, becoming the 21st member alongside the 19 countries and the European Union. This was widely seen as correcting a representational imbalance for a continent of ~1.4–1.5 billion people.
South Africa’s 2025 presidency (the first on African soil, culminating in the Johannesburg Leaders’ Summit on 22–23 November 2025 under the theme “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability”) marked a high point for African priorities. It built on consecutive Global South presidencies (Indonesia, India, Brazil) and featured roughly 130 official meetings, including about 25 high-level ministerial ones. Key focuses included:
- Debt sustainability for low-income countries (critical given that the AU has noted many members in or at risk of debt distress).
- Disaster resilience and response.
- Mobilising finance for a just energy transition and climate resilience.
- Harnessing critical minerals for inclusive growth.
- Broader issues such as inequality, financial inclusion, access to capital, Multilateral Development Bank reforms, and elements of a global minimum corporate tax.
The Leaders’ Declaration heavily referenced Africa and these themes. The US boycotted the summit (citing disputed claims related to South Africa and rejecting the agenda’s emphasis on climate and related issues), did not endorse the declaration, and later effectively blocked or declined to accredit South Africa for 2026 G20 participation under its presidency. South Africa has described this period as a temporary “holiday” from active involvement, planning to re-engage more fully under the UK presidency in 2027. This left the AU as Africa’s main institutional representative.
AU Efforts and Limitations in 2026
The AU has taken steps to fill the gap and coordinate:
- It has worked with South Africa (which retains deep institutional experience) to frame contributions; AU G20 meetings have involved South African support.
- In April 2026 it convened a strategic retreat in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, to align African positions with the US agenda (growth, deregulation, energy abundance, trade, innovation), prepare a roadmap, and link efforts to Agenda 2063 priorities such as industrialisation, debt, and inclusive growth. AU officials stressed that success would be measured by tangible impact rather than mere presence.
However, outcomes have been limited. The AU does not appear to have publicly released the expected roadmap or detailed outcome documents from the retreat. Sustained public communication of priorities, negotiating objectives, and gains has been lacking. The US presidency has sharply narrowed the agenda and calendar (far fewer meetings, focused on core economic/financial issues like private-sector engagement, productivity, global imbalances, digital assets, and a limited reaffirmation of the G20 Common Framework for debt, with emphasis on creditor burden-sharing). Broader developmental elements from prior years—especially those prioritised under South Africa—have largely been set aside.
At the recent G20 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting in Asheville, North Carolina, the Chair’s Statement (not a full consensus communiqué, due to Chinese objections on several points) reflected this shift. The AU joined other members in supporting it, including language welcoming the “successful streamlining” of the finance track. Analysts note this effectively endorsed the pruning of much of the prior developmental agenda. While some Western members had privately viewed South Africa’s agenda as overly broad, the scale of the shift under the US has been described as excessive.
Broader Implications and Outlook
The AU’s permanent seat was a historic step that institutionalises a collective African voice beyond any single country. South Africa’s presidency demonstrated what elevated African prioritisation can look like in the forum. Yet translating membership into sustained influence is harder, especially under a presidency hostile to the previous developmental framing and amid geopolitical tensions that sidelined South Africa.
Observers (including from the Institute for Security Studies) suggest the AU and other development-oriented members may be deliberately sitting out or keeping a low profile during the US year, preserving energy for the UK presidency in 2027, when continuity on elements of the South African agenda might be more feasible. The risk, however, is that a year of reduced visibility and pushback normalises a thinner baseline for African priorities in the G20.
In short, the AU holds the formal seat and is coordinating with South Africa and member states, but it has not yet successfully or visibly “taken the baton” in the sense of defending and advancing the developmental agenda that defined Africa’s recent G20 moment. Progress remains more symbolic and preparatory than transformative under current conditions. The picture could shift with the 2027 UK presidency and ongoing internal AU efforts to strengthen coordination mechanisms.
