U.S. President Donald Trump instructed the Pentagon (specifically referring to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as “Secretary of War”) to “substantially reduce” the annual joint military exercises with South Korea, known as Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS)

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The order came via a Truth Social post on Sunday, August 16, just hours before the drills were set to begin on Monday, August 17 (running through August 27). Trump stated it was too late to cancel them outright.

Key points from Trump’s statement

  • He cited his “very good relationship” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and said the exercises send a “totally inappropriate and hostile” signal to a country that, “as long as Donald J. Trump has been President, has been unthreatening and respectful.”
  • He highlighted the cost, noting that much of it is paid by the United States “as usual.”
  • He also referenced South Korea’s refusal to join U.S. efforts related to the “denuclearization” of Iran (phrased as Seoul saying “No thanks!” when asked).

This marks the first such public order to scale back the drills in Trump’s second term. It echoes his first-term approach, when joint exercises were suspended or reduced (e.g., after the 2018 Singapore summit with Kim), often described by him then as “provocative,” “inappropriate,” and expensive.

About the exercises

Ulchi Freedom Shield is one of the two major annual combined exercises between the U.S. and South Korea. It typically involves roughly 18,000 South Korean troops alongside U.S. forces (part of the ~28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea) and personnel from United Nations Command member states. Activities include field training, computer simulations, command-post exercises, and elements focused on emerging threats such as drones, GPS disruption, cyberattacks, and lessons drawn from North Korean troops’ involvement in the Ukraine war.

South Korea’s Defense Ministry and Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed the exercises began as previously notified and scheduled. As of early reporting on August 17, Seoul had not received a formal U.S. request to alter the scale, though officials noted that adjustments could still occur if requested. South Korean authorities had already planned a somewhat reduced number of field drills compared to the prior year.

Broader context and reactions

  • North Korea: Pyongyang has long denounced these drills as “rehearsals for invasion” or “aggressive war.” In the days leading up to UFS, North Korea conducted ballistic missile tests (at least two reported since early August) in apparent protest, and its Foreign Ministry issued strong warnings about heightened threats and responses. No immediate specific reaction to Trump’s scale-back order was widely reported in initial coverage; analysts noted Pyongyang would likely wait to see actual reductions before responding and might view a partial cut as insufficient compared to a full cancellation.
  • Alliance and domestic politics: The move has raised concerns about readiness, deterrence against North Korea (whose capabilities have advanced, including through battlefield experience in Ukraine and closer ties with Russia), and the strength of the U.S.–South Korea alliance. Critics, including some U.S. lawmakers such as Sen. Mark Kelly, called it shortsighted. In South Korea, the opposition People Power Party criticized the Lee Jae-myung administration, linking the order to perceived weaknesses in alliance management and security policy. Experts have interpreted the step partly as an attempt to create diplomatic space with Kim Jong Un, consistent with Trump’s interest in renewed engagement.
  • Implementation details: The Pentagon initially referred questions to the White House. Exact changes (e.g., fewer U.S. personnel, equipment, or specific components) were not immediately detailed in public reporting.

This fits a longer pattern of Trump viewing large-scale joint exercises with South Korea through the lenses of cost-sharing, signaling to North Korea, and personal diplomacy with Kim. The full practical impact on this year’s UFS—and any longer-term effects on combined readiness or inter-Korean/U.S.–North Korea dynamics—will depend on how the Pentagon implements the order and how Seoul and Pyongyang respond in the coming days and weeks.

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