Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Maxim Oreshkin told President Vladimir Putin and African leaders that Russian banks, partner banks abroad, and non-bank institutions using digital technologies now process international payments “without using the Western financial system, which is inefficient, expensive, [and] associated with a large volume of risks.” He contrasted this with the situation five years earlier, when Russia (like many countries) relied mainly on the US dollar and euro for foreign trade.
Finance Minister Anton Siluanov highlighted the Russian company A7, described as preparing cross-border payment services for Africa with “one-click” transactions at a fee of about 0.3%. Putin characterized A7 as a sovereign payment system that operates transparently and in full compliance with international law. He emphasized that it supports instant conversion between traditional and digital currencies and that “nobody can cut you off—from a technological standpoint, it’s impossible to block such payments.”
Russia also urged greater use of its SPFS (System for Transfer of Financial Messages, the Bank of Russia’s messaging system developed as a SWIFT alternative since 2014), the pan-African payment system already operating on the continent, settlements in national currencies, expanded correspondent banking relationships, and the opening of bank branches in partner countries.
Broader Context of A7 and Alternatives
A7 (linked to the sanctioned defense-sector bank Promsvyazbank and Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor) emerged after 2022 sanctions disconnected many Russian banks from SWIFT. Western reporting (including Financial Times investigations based on leaked documents) describes it as a parallel network that has handled large volumes of cross-border activity—reportedly tens of billions of dollars—via methods including stablecoins (such as the ruble-linked A7A5), promissory notes, cash channels, and chains of intermediary/front companies in third countries. Critics and US authorities have characterized elements of it as sanctions-evasion infrastructure; the US Treasury has designated A7-related entities. Russian sources present it as a practical, resilient sovereign solution.
Other Russian tools and related initiatives include:
- Expanded use of SPFS (hundreds of participants, including some foreign ones).
- Crypto, gold, netting/clearing arrangements, and national-currency settlements for trade with partners in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere.
- Ongoing BRICS discussions around interoperable systems (sometimes referred to under the BRICS Pay umbrella) that aim to link national payment rails (e.g., Russia’s Faster Payments System with India’s UPI) for local-currency transactions without relying on Western intermediaries. These remain developmental and are not positioned by all participants as a full SWIFT replacement.
The showcase fits Russia’s broader post-2022 push for “payment sovereignty” and reduced dependence on Western-controlled rails amid sanctions. Official Russian statements stress technological unblockability, lower costs, and mutual benefit for partners (especially in Africa). Independent analyses note that while alternatives have enabled continued trade flows, they often still interface indirectly with dollar/euro systems at some points in the chain, carry higher operational complexity or opacity risks, and face ongoing Western countermeasures.
