Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has renewed his long-standing advocacy for deeper East African political integration, specifically pushing a political confederation as a pragmatic transitional step toward a full federation of the East African Community (EAC).
This latest emphasis came in early August 2026, just before a working visit to Dar es Salaam (August 5–6), while Museveni serves as chair of the EAC Heads of State Summit (he took over from Kenya’s William Ruto in April 2026). His priorities as chair include advancing political unity, integrating Somalia more fully into the Customs Union, and addressing security crises involving the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Key Elements of the Current Push
Museveni has framed political integration as essential for strategic defence and economic scale. He argues that East Africans are “the same people” despite colonial borders and that only political unity enables capabilities individual states cannot achieve alone—particularly a joint regional navy (to give landlocked members like Uganda access to ocean defence) and a shared space programme.
He has shifted emphasis from an immediate full political federation (one government, one people, one country) to a confederation. Under this model:
- Partner states would largely retain national sovereignty.
- The confederation would have its own institutions, officials, and funding.
- It would deal primarily with member states rather than individual citizens.
- It would hold powers to suspend or expel members that violate the confederal constitution.
- It is explicitly positioned as a stepping stone to build trust and legal alignment before full federation.
Uganda’s Minister for EAC Affairs (and EAC Council of Ministers chair) Rebecca Kadaga has described the confederation as a major goal for Museveni’s one-year chairmanship, expressing hope that remaining national consultations can be completed so the process can advance. A committee of experts, chaired by former Ugandan Chief Justice Benjamin Odoki, is gathering stakeholder views and preparing to draft a model constitution; Museveni has called for the process to be expedited.
Consultations on public views have been completed in Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda. Tanzania, South Sudan, Somalia, and the DRC have not yet finished theirs.
Broader Context and History
The EAC currently has eight members: Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, DRC, and Somalia. Its four pillars are the Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union, and Political Federation. Progress on the first two has been uneven (visa-free travel and common external tariffs exist in practice, but non-tariff barriers, roaming charges, and ad-hoc fees persist in some states). The Monetary Union timeline remains fluid.
Museveni has championed East African political federation for decades, dating back to the near-miss of the 1960s (when Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania came close) and the EAC’s revival in 1999. He has repeatedly linked it to Pan-African ideals while rejecting a continent-wide “United States of Africa” (as once promoted by Muammar Gaddafi) as impractical, preferring workable regional blocs. Earlier efforts, including national consultations launched in Uganda around 2019 and a 2024 EAC heads-of-state decision to expedite the process, have not produced a federation.
He consistently argues that colonial-era borders leave countries too small to defend themselves adequately on land, sea, air, and in space, or to build competitive economies and markets. A federation of roughly 300–340+ million people, spanning from the Indian Ocean to the Congo Basin, would create scale for defence, industry, and global bargaining power.
Challenges and Criticisms
Significant obstacles remain:
- Sovereignty concerns: Analysts note that ceding control over defence, foreign policy, and security is the core barrier. Partner states fiercely guard national autonomy.
- Implementation gaps: The EAC has struggled with even more basic goals (customs union and common market), due to protectionism, unpaid dues (estimated arrears around $98 million in some reporting), divergent legal and administrative systems (Anglophone vs. Francophone legacies), and weak enforcement of protocols.
- Political and security tensions: Rivalries (e.g., Rwanda–DRC, historical Burundi–Rwanda frictions), border issues, domestic governance problems (including disputed elections), and varying democratic quality complicate trust.
- Public awareness: Surveys indicate many ordinary East Africans know little about the federation proposals, creating a gap between elite rhetoric and popular engagement. Informal cross-border trade and cultural ties often outpace formal political integration.
- Skepticism on feasibility: Critics describe the goal as unrealistic or premature, arguing that “lip service” exceeds institutional capacity and political will. Some predict the confederation push will stall, as earlier federation efforts did.
Supporters, including Kadaga and at times other leaders such as Kenya’s Ruto in prior statements, see political unity as the solution to small national markets, fragmented defence, and limited global influence. Museveni’s long tenure and consistent advocacy give the idea continuity, but also raise questions about personal or dynastic motivations in the eyes of detractors.
Implications
If advanced, a confederation could strengthen collective security responses (relevant given conflicts in eastern DRC, South Sudan, and Somalia), improve infrastructure and energy cooperation (Uganda and Tanzania have recent energy partnership moves), and create a larger internal market. It would test whether the EAC can move beyond economic protocols toward shared political institutions while managing the absorption of newer, more complex members like DRC and Somalia.
Full political federation remains a long-term aspiration without a firm deadline. The current consultative and confederation-focused phase in 2026 represents the latest iteration of a vision that has persisted, with varying intensity, for over two decades under Museveni’s leadership. Outcomes will depend on whether the remaining national consultations conclude, whether leaders can bridge sovereignty fears, and whether practical gains in trade and security build the necessary trust.
