- Ukraine’s right of self-defense: Ukraine has an inherent right under Article 51 of the UN Charter to defend itself against Russia’s aggression. States may assist with arms, training, intelligence, and related support without automatically becoming parties to the conflict or co-belligerents. This is the consistent position of the Netherlands and most NATO/EU countries since 2022. Dutch officials have repeatedly stated that Ukraine may use Dutch-origin systems in accordance with international humanitarian law (IHL).
- Private actors vs. state control: Destinus is a private company. Export licenses (granted by the Dutch authorities for systems supplied to Ukraine) regulate transfers of materiel; they do not automatically make the Dutch state responsible for every subsequent action of company employees. Under the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, private conduct is attributable to the state only if it is directed, controlled, or adopted by the state. Dutch statements emphasize that the Netherlands is not a party to the conflict and that operational decisions (targets, launches) rest with Ukrainian forces.
- Technical support vs. direct participation in hostilities: The Dutch Ministry of Defence has drawn a clear distinction: general instruction on how a system works does not constitute direct participation; actively launching or operating a weapons system against a party to the conflict does. Destinus has publicly framed its staff activities as technical support under contract, under Ukrainian direction, and (in the case of interceptor testing) sometimes with inert payloads. Civilians who do cross into direct participation lose civilian protection under IHL for the duration of that participation and become lawful targets, but that is a personal/company risk, not automatic state co-belligerency.
How this applies to Destinus personnel and the Crimean Bridge context
Destinus (Dutch-headquartered, with production in Hengelo and other sites) has supplied Ruta cruise missiles and Da Vinci/Lord systems that Ukraine used in the mid-November 2026 strikes that partially collapsed a span of the Crimean Bridge; the company publicly claimed credit after President Zelenskyy named the systems.
Separately, an NRC investigation reported that Destinus personnel have been present in Ukraine since at least 2023 for testing and operational support of company systems—including launching/operating interceptor drones against Russian Shaheds under Ukrainian direction and earlier testing of attack drones that entered Russian airspace. The company denies conducting independent military operations and insists Ukrainian forces select targets and decide on use.
There is no public evidence that the Dutch government specifically authorized or directed Destinus personnel for the Crimean Bridge operation itself. Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen stated the ministry had no further details on Destinus’s specific role in that strike. The government’s broader posture is that it supports Ukraine’s defense with materiel (including large Destinus orders, such as the €250 million package for hundreds of Ruta missiles), that companies make their own decisions about the depth of engagement, and that all parties must stay within IHL. Defence Minister Dilan Yeşilgöz and other officials have declined detailed comment on the personnel reports, citing operational security and the general principle that Dutch help is consistent with IHL. Prime Minister Rob Jetten has dismissed Russian claims that the Netherlands is becoming a party to the conflict.
Practical justifications the government can (and does) advance
- Materiel + limited technical presence is standard allied practice. Many Western defense firms maintain personnel in Ukraine for training, maintenance, integration, and testing. Framing Destinus activity this way keeps it on the “support” side of the line.
- No Dutch military or government direction of strikes. Ukrainian command and control is the decisive factor.
- Strategic and industrial interest. Supporting Ukraine strengthens European security; combat-proven systems benefit the Dutch/European defense industrial base (Destinus is a significant domestic contractor).
- Export-control compliance. Licenses were granted under the usual criteria; end-use responsibility then shifts primarily to Ukraine.
Risks and counter-arguments the government must manage
Active deployment of systems by company personnel can constitute direct participation in hostilities. Experts and the MoD itself have noted this. A sustained pattern, or clear evidence of Dutch state direction, could strengthen Russian claims of co-belligerency, increase the risk of retaliation against Dutch interests or personnel, and create domestic legal/political pressure. Russia has already used the Destinus claims (and the bridge strike) to question whether the Netherlands remains a bystander. The government response has been to reaffirm non-party status, Ukraine’s rights, and the distinction between arms support and combat participation, while avoiding granular operational commentary.
In short, the Dutch government can justify allowing (or not actively blocking) Destinus personnel involvement by treating it as private technical assistance to a state exercising self-defense, consistent with the same legal and policy framework used for the broader Western arms pipeline to Ukraine. Whether that framing fully covers every reported activity—especially any kinetic testing or operation of systems—is precisely the point of current domestic debate and Russian diplomatic pressure.

